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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1152 
_____________ 
 
KENNETH M. KILPATRICK, 
                                                          Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-16-cv-01193) 
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 28, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 18, 2018) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
  
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Kenneth M. Kilpatrick appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA” or 
“the agency”) and its order denying his motion for reconsideration.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 Kilpatrick began working at the VA Regional Office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
as an information technology specialist in April 2003.  In January 2009, he received a 
new work computer.  He was informed that he had until February 1st to transfer over his 
data, programs, and other tools he used to perform his job duties from the old workstation 
to his new workstation.  During the process of setting up his new computer, Kilpatrick 
without permission used a password reset program to create a new administrator 
password and installed a memory chip that he removed from an unused computer.   
 A VA system administrator discovered that Kilpatrick had gained administrator 
access, and he emailed management about the issue on January 25, 2009.1  Carol Winter, 
director of the information technology center (“ITC”) and Kilpatrick’s third-line 
supervisor, told the VA information security officer on February 5, 2009 to “conduct [an] 
investigation in accordance with the VA directives.”  App. 213a.  On the same day, 
                                                 
1   The administrator account password was changed at least four times, including 
after Kilpatrick was warned not to do so.   
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Kilpatrick’s direct and second-line supervisors notified him of the investigation, gave him 
a medical information request form,2 seized his work computer, and provided him with a 
replacement computer.  Kilpatrick’s access to internet and email was revoked on 
February 11th as a result of the information security officer finding more evidence of 
unauthorized software access.  As part of the investigation, Kilpatrick did not dispute 
resetting the password to gain administrator privileges or taking the memory chip from 
another workstation.   
Meanwhile, on February 17, 2009, Kilpatrick sought Equal Employment 
Opportunity (“EEO”) counseling from the VA’s Office of Resolution Management for 
discriminatory harassment on the basis of his physical disability and a hostile work 
environment.  The instances of discrimination or hostile work environment that he 
highlighted, including the seizure of his computer, all related to the investigation he first 
learned about on February 5th.  He identified his second-line supervisor, Terris Farmer, 
as an alleged harasser.  Winter, who was also Farmer’s direct supervisor, received notice 
of Kilpatrick’s EEO request and allegations on February 24, 2009.   
Farmer issued a proposed removal notice to Kilpatrick on April 2, 2009,3 citing 
                                                 
2   The medical information request form was based on observations of Kilpatrick, 
including an occasion when he “forgot about a work project he worked on for six months, 
and was still assigned to work on.”  App. 304a.  He had “blamed his forgetfulness on 
medication.”  Id.  
3   Farmer testified at the arbitration hearing that the delay between the start of the 
investigation and the proposed removal notice was a result of the fact that the individuals 
involved needed time to consider how to handle the Kilpatrick situation “along with 
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the “removal of, and installation of memory board(s) from an unused PC to [his] PC,” as 
well as modification of the administrator’s account password through use of a password 
cracking utility.  App. 300a.  The notice also stated that Kilpatrick’s conduct “is in 
violation of VA Directive 6500, VA Rules of Behavior, and ITC Rules of Behavior.”  Id.  
On May 11, 2009, Kilpatrick responded to the charges, with the assistance of his union 
representatives, in an oral presentation to Winter.  Kilpatrick “admitted to the charges 
that were documented in the proposed removal” and “that he violated the VA policy.”  
App. 199a.  Kilpatrick did not provide the names of any other employees who either were 
engaging in similar conduct or would have additional information.   
 On May 28, 2009, Winter decided to terminate Kilpatrick’s employment effective 
June 5, 2009.  Farmer had no input regarding the final decision.  In support of the 
termination decision, Winter noted that the incidents around the memory chip and 
password reset were a “second violation,” in that at least one year earlier Kilpatrick “used 
[remote] access from a hotel and left a laptop computer logged into the VA for many 
hours, unattended in a hotel room, with access to the VA.”  App. 198a. 
Kilpatrick’s union representative filed, on his behalf, a grievance regarding the 
termination decision.  The grievance asked the arbitrator to determine whether “the 
                                                 
doing all the other tasks that [they] had to do.”  App. 192a.  She also testified that the 
process was not “routine” to her because she had not dealt with “very many disciplinary 
actions . . . in [her] federal career.”  SA 134.   
Farmer also testified that she could not recall whether, at the time she issued the 
proposed removal notice, she knew that Kilpatrick had contacted an EEOC counselor.   
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penalty of termination [was] unreasonable and/or excessive” and whether the termination 
was “motivated by discrimination based upon his prior EEO (equal employment 
opportunity) activity.”  App. 115a.  On the first issue, the arbitrator concluded that the 
VA’s “choice of the disciplinary penalty of termination was both excessive and 
unreasonable.”4  App. 155a.  On the second issue, relevant to this appeal, the arbitrator 
stated that “she cannot conclude that management’s true intent was to punish the grievant 
for his having contacted an EEO counselor.”  App. 156a. 
Kilpatrick then filed a request with the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 
(“MSPB”) for review of the arbitration decision.  The MSPB agreed with the arbitrator 
that, while there was a due process violation, Kilpatrick “did not prove by preponderant 
evidence that the agency retaliated against him based on his meeting with an EEO 
counselor.”  App. 168a.  Kilpatrick sought review of the portion of the MSPB order 
pertaining to the retaliation claim before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”).  The EEOC also concluded that Kilpatrick “did not demonstrate 
that any conduct on the part of the [VA] was based on discriminatory animus.”  App. 
177a. 
 In March 2016, Kilpatrick brought this case in the District Court, asking it to 
reverse the “decisions of the arbitrator, MSPB and EEOC related to the issue of 
                                                 
4   The arbitrator directed the VA “to rescind the termination of the grievant’s 
employment and to convert the discipline imposed to a 10-working day suspension 
without pay.”  App. 157a. 
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discrimination” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 
(2012).  App. 39a.  On September 26, 2017, the District Court granted the VA’s motion 
for summary judgment on the basis that Kilpatrick failed to demonstrate that he satisfied 
a prima facie case of retaliation and, even he had met this burden, he would be unable to 
“produce evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether Defendant’s purported legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination 
was pretextual.”5  App. 27a.  The lower court subsequently denied Kilpatrick’s motion to 
amend findings of fact and judgment or, in the alternative, motion for reconsideration on 
December 5, 2017.  Kilpatrick timely appealed from the District Court’s motion for 
summary judgment and motion for reconsideration orders.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(1)(B), (a)(4)(A). 
II. Jurisdiction 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. 
§ 7703(b)(2).  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. Analysis 
 On appeal, Kilpatrick argues the District Court “fail[ed] to adhere to summary 
                                                 
5   The District Court’s language refers to an out-of-date version of Rule 56, under 
which summary judgment was appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) 
(amended 2010).  In 2010, Rule 56 was revised so that “genuine dispute” replaces 
“genuine issue.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
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judgment principles” in concluding that it was appropriate to enter judgment in favor of 
the VA.  Appellant’s Br. 2.  We review the District Court’s summary judgment ruling de 
novo.  Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate if, “viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party,” Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 
F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006), “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Shuker 
v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 770 (3d Cir. 2018).   
 The framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973), governs our analysis of Kilpatrick’s retaliation claim.  See Woodson v. Scott 
Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997).  To establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation, Kilpatrick “must show (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that he 
was discharged subsequent to or contemporaneously with such activity; and (3) that a 
causal link exists between the protected activity and the discharge.”6  Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 
873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989).  If he does so, the burden shifts to the VA to offer a 
“legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its conduct.”  Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 257.  
                                                 
6   Although a plaintiff must ultimately show that retaliatory animus was the but-
for cause for the adverse employment action, this Court has held that “a plaintiff alleging 
retaliation has a lesser causal burden at the prima facie stage.”  Carvalho-Grevious v. 
Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2017).  At that stage, “the plaintiff must 
produce evidence ‘sufficient to raise the inference that her protected activity was the 
likely reason for the adverse [employment] action.’”  Id. (quoting Kachmar v. SunGard 
Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
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If the employer satisfies its burden, Kilpatrick must then “convince the factfinder both 
that the employer’s proffered explanation was false [that is, a pretext], and 
that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (quoting 
Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 We reach the same conclusion as the District Court that Kilpatrick has not 
established a prima facie case of retaliation.  His primary hurdle is the requirement to 
show that a causal link exists between his EEO counseling request and his termination.  
Arguably, there is some degree of temporal proximity, in that the EEO complaint was 
made approximately six weeks before the issuance of the proposed removal notice and 
over three months before the effective date of termination.  This timing, however, is not 
“unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive.”  Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494, 
505 (3d Cir. 2000).  Compare Jalil, 873 F.2d at 708 (finding a causal link where “the 
discharge followed rapidly, only two days later, upon [the employer’s] receipt of notice 
of [the plaintiff’s] EEOC claim”), with Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 
114 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that where “over three weeks [had] passed between the 
complaint and the termination letter,” “the temporal proximity is not so close as to be 
unduly suggestive” (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 513 (3d Cir. 
2003)).  This is especially so in light of the fact that Winter had directed an investigation 
into Kilpatrick’s conduct twelve days before he (Kilpatrick) filed a request for informal 
EEO counseling.  See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 
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F.3d 130, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n employee may not insulate herself from termination 
by covering herself with the cloak of Title VII’s opposition protections after committing 
non-protected conduct that was the basis for the decision to terminate.”).  And there is no 
evidence in the record of antagonism or retaliatory animus in the time between the 
February 17th complaint and June 5th termination.  See Marasco, 318 F.3d at 513. 
Kilpatrick contends that the excessive and unreasonable choice of disciplinary 
penalty is “dispositive as to the issue of the existence of triable issues of fact and . . . 
compels a finding that summary disposition against Kilpatrick cannot be supported.”  
Appellant’s Br. 12.  The excessiveness of the action taken, though, does not bolster the 
position that the likely reason for it was retaliation.  See Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 
130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The question is not whether the employer made the 
best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].” 
(quoting Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)).  Where 
Kilpatrick admitted to violating VA policy and that violation was a sufficient basis for 
disciplinary action, retaliation no longer appears to be the likely reason for either the 
proposed removal notice or termination.  Along those lines, even if Kilpatrick had 
satisfied all three prongs of the prima facie case, he has failed to present evidence that the 
VA’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was pretext for 
improper animus, particularly where he did not identify any comparators.   
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 On appeal, Kilpatrick also challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion for 
reconsideration under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See ECF No. 
49, at 1.  We generally review such decisions for abuse of discretion.  Max’s Seafood 
Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).  Kilpatrick, 
however, makes no specific argument in his opening brief as to in what manner the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to alter judgment.  We 
therefore deem it waived.  See Long Hao Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 140 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2011) (concluding that the petitioner waived a claim where he did not make “any separate 
arguments concerning that claim or point[] to any evidence that would compel a different 
result”).  In any event, we discern no reason to reverse the District Court’s December 5, 
2017 order. 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the final judgment of the District Court.  
